Non-Citizen Voting Rights

In 1993, Japan’s Supreme Court ruled that the constitution guarantees voting rights only to Japanese citizens, but that a hypothetical national law granting local suffrage to foreigners would be constitutionally acceptable [1]. Nevertheless, because of influential rightist elements in the LDP, no such laws have passed in the 17 years since the Supreme Court decision, despite repeated attempts by the Komeito and the DPJ, and signs that a large majority of the Japanese population supports such rights [2].

Ichiro Ozawa, the DPJ’s Secretary General, has strongly pushed a proposal that would grant local suffrage to the over 900,000 foreigners with permanent residency status [3]. After the DPJ took power in August 2009, it seemed briefly that, with his support, Japan might join the growing number of countries with some form of non-citizen voting rights* as early as this year.

Mindan (在日本大韓民国民団, the nationwide association of South Koreans in Japan) was instrumental in bringing this issue to the fore; in the lead up to the August 2009 elections, Mindan threw its support behind DPJ proponents of the policy [4]. Ozawa values this support highly, and his hurry to deliver on the campaign promise may be in part a bid to maintain Mindan’s support during the election in the summer of 2010. However, the DPJ has yet to submit a bill, and in face of opposition from within the party and the ruling coalition, appears to have shelved the proposal for the time being [5].

Ironically, it may have been Mindan’s crucial support for voting rights that has helped solidify the opposition to Ozawa’s proposal. Opponents’ most urgent criticism is that foreigner suffrage would provide an avenue for foreign governments to influence internal affairs [6]; as Mindan receives operating funds from the South Korean government [7], its success in pushing the issue this far seems to prove the opponents’ point.

In actuality, this argument completely mischaracterizes Mindan’s accomplishment, and the implications of foreign suffrage. In the long term, Mindan’s movement would not primarily benefit South Korea, or even Koreans in Japan. Since Koreans are Japan’s oldest foreign minority, they are also the most integrated. The number of Koreans with permanent residence actually decreases every year, as more long-term residents naturalize [8]. And as many who have not naturalized have lived in Japan for up to four generations, it is highly unlikely that obeying hypothetical marching orders from the South Korean government would benefit them in any way.

Furthermore, the permanent foreign resident community is increasingly diverse: Chinese, Brazilians and Filipinos all make up a growing share [9]. Although Koreans historically have held a supermajority, in the future, no single nationality will dominate Japan’s foreign population. This growing diversity makes it even more unlikely that large numbers of non-citizens would be able to organize along national lines to successfully promote their home country’s national interests to the detriment of Japan’s, even if they wanted to, which the evidence suggests that they do not.

There are plenty of legitimate arguments for and against foreigner voting rights, but there is no evidence to support that interference by foreign governments is one of them. Hopefully proponents will debunk this baseless criticism, and voters and lawmakers will consider the proposal on its actual merits and demerits, not on ill-reasoned paranoia.

* Around 40 countries allow some form of non-citizen suffrage. EU member nations permit foreign residents who hold citizenship in another EU country to vote in local elections; a smaller number of countries, including Korea, Venezuela, and Belgium grant local voting rights to foreigners who have met a multi-year residency requirement and (in some cases) hold specific visas [10] .

1. Supreme Court of Japan, Senkyo Jinmeibou Futouroku Shobun ni taisuru Igi no Moshide Kyakka Kettei Torikeshi, February 28, 1993 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.courts.go.jp/search/jhsp0030?action_id=dspDetail&hanreiSrchKbn=02&hanreiNo=25633&hanreiKbn=01

2. Gaikokujin Sanseiken ni Sansei 60%, Hantai 29% Asahi Shimbun Chousa, Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 2010 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY201001180431.html

3. Hoshuuha Hanpatsu Kamaeru Minshu, Asahi Shimbun, December 2, 2009 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://mytown.asahi.com/aichi/news.php?k_id=24000120912020001.

4. Zainichi Mindan "Gaikokujin Sanseiken ni Sansei no Kohou wo Shien", Toua Nippou, August 20, 2009 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://japan.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=060000&biid=2009082046918 .

5. Gaikokujin no Chihou Senkyoken, Shushou ga Shinchou Shisei, February 9, 2006 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20100116-014762/news/20100209-OYT1T01090.htm .

6. Nagao, Kazuhiro, Gaikokujin Senkyoken Dounyuu ha Kenpou Ihan, Chuo Online: Yomiuri Shimbun, February 25, 2010 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/opinion/index.htm .

Gaikokujin Senkyoken ni Hantai suru Kai, homepage [cited 2010 March 29]; http://www.geocities.jp/sanseiken_hantai/

7. Nagao, Kazuhiro, Gaikokujin Senkyoken Dounyuu ha Kenpou Ihan, Chuo Online: Yomiuri Shimbun, February 25, 2010 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/adv/chuo/opinion/index.htm .

8. Ministry of Justice, Touroku Gaikokujin Toukei Toukeihyo, 2006-2008, [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.moj.go.jp/TOUKEI/ichiran/touroku.html .

9. Ibid.

10. Immigrant Voting Project, Non-Citizen Voting Around the World., Updated September 2, 2006 [cited 2010 March 29]; Available from: http://www.immigrantvoting.org/material/world.html

Japan, Korea, Migration News, July 2006, Vol. 13, No. 3. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3212_0_3_0.

International Marriage

In 2007, more than 1 in 20 marriages (5.6%) in Japan took place between foreign and Japanese citizens [1]. Particularly striking are the figures for marriages between Japanese men and foreign women. In 80% of international marriages, the male partner is Japanese; and assuming all foreign women lived in Japan before marriage and are counted in the population statistics, 9.7% of unmarried women of foreign citizenship in Japan marry a Japanese man every year, while only 2.8% of unmarried Japanese women do [2]*. Clearly, Japanese men and foreign women are actively seeking each other out, but why?

Japanese men may be marrying foreign women because they have difficulties finding suitable Japanese partners. The average age of a Japanese man embarking on an international marriage is 43, compared to 31 for a Japanese man marrying a Japanese woman [3]. This suggests that marrying a foreign woman is not men’s first choice, but as men age, they become more willing to search further afield for a bride.

As for foreign wives, economic incentives undoubtedly lure many to Japan to live and work, but why do so many end up marrying Japanese men? Unlike their husbands, the average age of foreign women is 31, not so different from the average marriage age of 29 for Japanese women [4] —presumably these women have other options for marriage.

The nationalities of women marrying Japanese men shed some light on this issue. Chinese woman account for 37% of foreign brides, Filipina 29%, Korean 18%, Thai 5%, and Brazilian 1%. [5] Given their percentages in the population, and thus the chance that they would meet and marry Japanese men under ordinary circumstances (i.e. not through a matchmaking service or marriage broker), these percentages are surprising.

Nationality	% of foreign brides	% of foreign unmarried women
Chinese	37%	26%
Philippines	29%	8%
Korean	18%	35%
Thai	8%	1%
Brazilian	1%	8%

[6 – Figures are from 2007]

The table shows that compared to their representation in Japan’s population of unmarried, foreign women, marriage rates to Japanese men are disproportionally low for Korean and Brazilian women, and high for Chinese, Filipina, and Thai women.

Japanese immigration policy is very different for the high and low groups. Most Koreans in Japan are special permanent residents whose employment is not restricted under immigration law, and most Brazilians enter under the Nikkei visa program, which likewise gives them long-term residency and access to employment [7]. Chinese, Filipina and Thai women, on the other hand, face high immigration barriers, and technically are not allowed to come to Japan for unskilled work at all. For these women, marrying a Japanese man is a fast track to a permanent residency visa, and legal access to any employment. In this way, Japan’s immigration policy likely pushes certain nationalities of women towards marriage with Japanese men.

Since women seem to marry for immigration status, ironically Japan’s restrictive immigration policy may make it easier for older and perhaps desperate men to find wives from abroad. If the immigration policy were loosened, an unexpected side effect might actually be fewer international marriages, as foreign women are no longer forced to rely on marriage as their passport to Japan.

*Figures for are for women 15 years old and up.

1. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Konin Kensuu, Nenji × Fusai no Kokusekibetsu, Dai 1 pen Dai 2 Shou Dai 1-37 Hyou, 2007 [cited 2010 January 25]; Available from: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/youran/data20k/1-37.xls.

2. Ibid.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Dai 3 Hyou Kokuseki (11 kubun), Haiguusha Kankei (4 kubun), Nenrei (5 sai Kaikyuu), Danjobetsu 15sai Ijou Gakokujinsuu, 2008 [cited 2010 January 25]; Available from: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?bid=000001012922&cycode=0. 　　　　　　

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Dai 5 Hyou Haiguusha Kankei (4 Kubun), Nenrei (Kakusai), Danjobetsu 15sai Ijou Jinkou oyobi Heikin Nenrei (Sousuu oyobi Nihonjin)- Zenkoku, 2006 [cited 2010 January 25] http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?bid=000001005118&cycode=0.

3. Minstry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Fusai no Kokusekibetsu ni mita Konin, 2007 [cited 2010 January 25]; Available from:http://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/konin06/konin06-3.html

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Dai 3 Hyou Kokuseki (11 kubun), Haiguusha Kankei (4 kubun), Nenrei (5 sai Kaikyuu), Danjobetsu 15sai Ijou Gakokujinsuu, 2008 [cited 2010 January 25]; Available from: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?bid=000001012922&cycode=0.

7. Ministry of Justice, Dai 1 Hyou Kokuseki (Shusshinchi) betsu Zairyuushikaku (Zairyuu Mokuteki) betsu Gaikokujin Tourokusuu, 2009 [cited 2010 January 25]; Available from: http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001057947.

Cheap Foreign Labor, Through the Back Door

Japan’s Industrial Trainee and Technical Internship Program brings 80,000 to 100,000 foreigners to Japan each year [1] to work for up to three years in industries such as agriculture, textiles, and food prep [2]. Japanese immigration policy makes no general provision for unskilled foreign workers; technically, no visa category exists for unskilled labor. But by calling the participants “trainees” and “interns,” the program has created an ad hoc mechanism to bring these types of workers to Japan. JITCO, the organization that facilitates the program, explains that it was introduced in 1993 in response to Japan’s labor shortage, but also touts “international development” and “skills and technology transfer” as its goals [3]. However, since most interns and trainees work low-paid, unskilled jobs, we can surmise that the program’s primary function is to provide cheap labor to struggling Japanese industries.

It is easy to see the program as a cynical creation of lawmakers eager to woo manufacturing and agricultural constituencies. Indeed, the record on this score is not good. Around 67% of participants come from mainland China, while Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam account for 22% combined [4]. Employers can easily exploit these often impoverished trainees and interns. The Asahi Shimbun describes how employers require the (often willing) interns to work illegal overtime [5], and sometimes pay interns and trainees far below the minimum wage for their work [6]. Many program participants tolerate these abuses, because they expect to earn $500 - $700 per month, far more than they could earn in their home countries [7], although still far less than Japanese employees in similar jobs. These and other problems became so widespread that the US Department of State singled out the program in its Trafficking in Persons Report [8].

However, lawmakers and bureaucrats did not sit idle while these criticisms came to light. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry both investigated and recommended reforms. In response to this, in July 2009 the Diet overwhelmingly voted to strengthen legal protection for trainees and interns and increase government oversight of employers [9]. For example, employers must now provide trainees with written contracts in their native languages, which are inspected by immigration officials. Trainees will be informed of their legal rights and obligations, and JITCO employees will inspect each place of employment once a month. The new regulations come into effect in one year [10].

These actions will certainly require a deeper investment of both government and employer resources. Even if the program is really a handout to crucial political constituencies, this heartening commitment demonstrates that the government is not willing to hand over cheap labor regardless of the human costs.

1. Ministry of Justice, Kenshuu, Ginou Jisshuu Seido no Genjou Oyobi Seido Kaisei no Gaiyou ni Tsuite, March 34, 2009 [cited 2009 December 15]; Available from: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jinzai/jitsumu/dai4/siryou2_1.pdf p.3.

2. Ibid, p. 2.

3. Japan Internation Training Cooperation Organization, Seido no Enkaku, Haikei, Chuugokujin Kenshuusei no Seikouritsu ha 3 Wari “Ihou Zangyou” mo Kakugo Available from: http://www.jitco.or.jp/system/seido_enkakuhaikei.html.

4. Ministry of Justice, Kenshuu, Ginou Jisshuu Seido no Genjou Oyobi Seido Kaisei no Gaiyou ni Tsuite, March 34, 2009 [cited 2009 December 15]; Available from: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/jinzai/jitsumu/dai4/siryou2_1.pdf p.3.

5. Okubo, Maki, Chuugokujin Kenshuusei no Seikouritsu ha 3 Wari “Ihou Zangyou” mo Kakugo, Asahi Shimbun, 18 July, 2009, [cited 2009 December 15]; Available from: http://www.asahi.com/business/update/0718/TKY200907180200_01.html.

6. Okubo, Maki, ed, “Osame no Nougyou” Jisshuusei ni Izon, Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 2009 [cited 2009 December 15]; Available from: http://www.asahi.com/special/08016/TKY200905040215.html.

7. Ibid.

8. US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, June, 2009 [cited 2009 December 15]; Available from: http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009/123136.htm .

9. Online Diet Record, [001/066] 171 - House of Councilors, Full Meeting #36 July 8, 2009 [cited 2009 December 15]; Available from: http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/swk_logout.cgi?SESSION=21550.

10. Ministry of Justice, Kenshuu, Ginou Jisshuu Seido no Mondaiten to Kongo no Sochi, October 2, 2009 [cited 2009 December 10]; Google search "研修技能実習制度の問題点と今後の措置" to retrieve this document.

Ambivalence towards Japan's New Jury System

Until this year, Japan was one of the only major industrialized democracies to use bench trials (trials by a judge or judges) in all criminal and civil cases [1]. To align Japan with the international standard, the Diet passed a law in 2004, effective this year, instituting a “lay judge” system [2]. Under the new system, panels of three professional judges and six “lay judges” chosen by lottery from the voter rolls try crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment [3]. Majority vote determines the verdict, with the stipulation that the panel cannot find the defendant guilty if all three professional judges are opposed [4]. Sentencing takes place through a more complicated formula. Although a majority vote (including at least one judge) can decide the sentence, because sentencing is not a yes/no proposition, situations arise in which no particular sentence has a majority. In this case, votes for the harshest sentence are added to votes for the second harshest sentence. If this creates a majority including at least one judge, the second harshest sentence will stand. If not, the votes for the first and second harshest sentences will be added to those for the third harshest sentence, and so on, until a majority including at least one judge is reached [5].

Attitudes towards the new system are ambivalent at best—a government survey conducted in 2008 on 10,000 people nationwide found that over 80% of respondents did not want to participate [6]. Nearly 40% of respondents in another survey expressed doubts that lay judges could make judgments as accurate and just as those of professional judges [7].

However, this does not mean that the new system is doomed to failure. Although these figures are high, not wanting to participate as a juror and lack of faith in the jury system are not unique to Japan. In the United States, reluctant jurors may request postponement or simply fail to appear for duty. Rates vary across districts, but a Florida court reported that more than 40% of those called for jury duty deferred or were truant. (Although some deferrers may have wished to serve, many jurors who did show up were no doubt reluctant.) [8]. Other countries have even higher rates; polls in Spain report that over 60% of respondents do not want to serve [9]. And although Americans, Brits, and Australians are documented as preferring jury trials to bench trials, a majority of Belgians and Spaniards respond that they prefer bench trials [10]. This preference has not led to the elimination of jury trials in either country—reluctance to serve and lack of faith in outcomes can coexist comfortably with a jury system. While public opinion may change the shape of Japan’s jury system, the system itself is here to stay, despite citizens’ ambivalent attitudes.

1. The Jury is Out, in The Economist. London: February 14, 2009.

2. Saibanin no Sanka suru Keiji Saiban ni Kansuru Houritsu, May 28, 2004. Updated November 11, 2007 [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/shiryo/pdf/02.pdf.

3. Saibanin no Sanka suru Keiji Houritsu no Gaiyou, [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/shiryo/pdf/01.pdf.

4. Iken ga Icchi shinakatara Hyouketsu ha dou naru no desu ka, in Saibanin Seido Q&A, [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/qa/c4_8.html.

5. 5nin Ijou no Kahansuu de Kettei Yuuzai ni ha Saibankan no Sansei Hitsuyou, in Kyodo News, March, 2009 [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://office.kyodo.co.jp/feature/saibanin/2009/03/post_194.html

6. Kabushikigaisha Inteeji Risaachi, Saibanin Seido ni Kansuru Ishiki Chousa Chousa Kekka Houkokusho, p.23, March, 2008 [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://www.saibanin.courts.go.jp/topics/pdf/08_04_01_isiki_tyousa/siryo1.pdf

7. Naikakufu Daijin Kanbou Seifu Kouhou Shitsu, Saibanin Seido ni Kansuru Ninshiki, February 2005, [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-saiban/2-2.html

8. Losh, Susan Carol, and Robert G. Boatwright, Lifestyle Factors, Status, and Civic Engagement: Issues of Age and Attitudes towards Jury Service, in Legal System Journal, 2002 [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4043/is_200201/ai_n9056067/pg_4/?tag=content;col1

9. Roberts, Julian V. and Mike Hough, Public Opinion and the Jury: An International Literature Review, p. 31, February 2009, [cited 2009 November 9]; Available from: http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/public-opinion-and-the-jury-by-roberts-and-hough-web(1).pdf

10. Ibid, p. 42.

Is Japan Discarding Foreign Workers?

In 2008, 258,498 foreigners lived in Japan on long-term residency visas [1], which allow descendants of Japanese citizens (Nikkei) and their families to live indefinitely in Japan [2].* As the economic outlook darkened in the fall of 2008, many of these visa holders lost their jobs. In response, the government began a program in April 2009 offering unemployed Nikkei residents 300,000yen, plus 200,000yen for every dependent family member, towards airfare to return to their home countries [3]. This program originally forbad aid recipients from returning to Japan indefinitely, but in face of harsh international and domestic criticism, the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare reduced the limit to three years in May 2009 [4]. As of December 1, 2009, 16,460 people had applied for the payment [5].

The Japanese government argues that the program is merely one plank in the support platform for Nikkei Japanese, including counseling and retraining programs, and that the primary motivation is the welfare of those who might want to return to their home countries to ride out the economic crisis. On the other hand, many immigrants, researchers, and advocates deride the plan, claiming that companies and the government used foreign workers during good economic times, and are merely discarding them in bad [6].

Claims that the program is solely for the benefit of the Nikkei residents are obviously suspicious. The government must expect to save money on returnees—subsidized public health insurance, welfare, and unemployment benefits could easily run much higher than the cost of return airfares, even in the short term [7].

But to what extent is the program humanitarian as well as pragmatic? For Nikkei desperate to return to their home countries, the economic assistance is no doubt welcome. However, we must ask why this program applies only to Nikkei visa holders, and not to foreign workers in other visa categories. Unlike other visa categories, the long-term resident visa allows holders to remain in Japan indefinitely, regardless of employment status [8]. Most work visas for foreigners become invalid if the holder is unemployed for a certain length of time. Were the main goal of the program humanitarian, it should logically be extended to all unemployed foreign workers. Because it targets only those who might choose to stay in Japan, we can only conclude that the primary motivation is fiscal, and that the government is indeed attempting to “discard” long-term foreign residents.

*Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees are also covered by this visa category, although they make up only a small percentage of the total.

1. Ministry of Justice, Zairyuu Shikakubetsu Gaikokujin Tourokushasuu no Suii, July 2007 [cited 2009 October 19]; Available from: http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/090710-1/090710-5.pdf

2. Sakura International Legal Office, Teijuusha [cited 2009 October 19]; Available from: http://www.sakura-ilo.com/shikaku/teiju1.html

3. Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, Nikkeijin Rishokusha ni taisuru Kikoku Shien Jigyou no Jisshi, March 31, 2009 [cited 2009 October 19]; Available from: http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2009/03/h0331-10.html

4. Igarashi, Makoto, Nikkeijin no Kikokushien Jigyou Sainyuukoku Seigen ha Gensoku 3nenkan, in Asahi Shimbun, May 5, 2009 [cited 2009 October 16]; Available from: http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0511/TKY200905110259.html

5. Nikkei Burajirujin Kukyou Shoku Ushinai Seikatsu Hogo Shinsei ga Kyuuzou, in Asahi Shimbun, December 15, 2009 [cited 2009 December 17]; Available from: http://chubu.yomiuri.co.jp/news_top/090727_1.htm

6. Tabuchi, Hiroko, Japan Pays Foreign Workers to Go Home, in the New York Times, April 22, 2009 [cited 2009 October 22]; Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/business/global/23immigrant.html

7. Nikeijin Shitsugyousha he no Kikoku Ryohi Shikyuu ni Sanpi no Koe, in Asahi Shimbun, April 12, 2009 [cited 2009 October 22]; Available from:

http://mytown.asahi.com/shizuoka/news.php?k_id=23000120904130001

8. Nagoya International Center, Ima Gaikokuseki Rodousha ha? NIC he no Soudan kara, in Chikyuu wo Kangeru, Volume 18, Winter/Spring, 2009 [cited 2009 October 22]; Available from: http://www.nic-nagoya.or.jp/japanese/kokusai_center_news/chikyu_wo_kangaeru/chikyu_wo_kangaeru2009_04.htm